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How a Firm’s Domestic Footprint and Domestic Environmental 
Uncertainties Jointly Shape Added Cultural Distances: The Roles of 
Resource Dependence and Headquarters Attention  
 
 
ABSTRACT. Even though many firms conduct most of their business domestically, international 
management research has remained remarkably silent on the role of a firm’s domestic footprint in its 
internationalization strategy. We shed light on that role by exploring how the size of a firm’s domestic 
footprint influences the cultural distance that the firm adds to its country portfolio when expanding 
internationally. Integrating resource dependence theory and the attention-based view, we hypothesize 
that a firm’s domestic footprint has a negative relationship with added cultural distance (ACD), and 
that domestic policy uncertainty strengthens this relationship whereas domestic demand uncertainty 
weakens it. We find robust support for our hypotheses in a sample of the world’s largest retailers 
covering the period 2000-2007, indicating that a firm’s domestic footprint and domestic 
environmental uncertainties jointly shape cross-cultural expansion strategies. Our findings suggest 
that ACDs reflect headquarters executives’ desire to avoid ineffective foreign expansions, hinting at 
possible biases in studies of the performance effects of distance.  
 
Keywords: added cultural distance, attention-based view, domestic footprint, domestic uncertainty, 
foreign expansion, resource dependence theory 
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INTRODUCTION  
Despite ever growing levels of international trade and foreign direct investment, most firms, including 
many of the world’s largest ones, still perform the bulk of their activities in their home country and 
can therefore be said to have a large domestic footprint (Asmussen, 2009; Carpenter and Fredrickson, 
2001; Hejazi, 2007). In the most comprehensive firm-level analysis of geographic footprints to date, 
Oh and Rugman (2014) found that the 804 firms that appeared on Fortune’s Global 500 list over the 
period 1999-2008 on average realized 54% of their sales domestically, a percentage comparable to 
that reported for the largest British firms (Rugman and Verbeke, 2007). Like other scholars 
(Carpenter and Fredrickson, 2001; Yip, Rugman and Kudina, 2006), Oh and Rugman also found 
substantial variation across their sample firms, with more than a quarter of them even realizing all of 
their sales domestically.  
Even though the domestic footprint of many firms has been shown to be sizeable, this 
footprint has been largely omitted as an explanatory factor from the substantial body of research that 
has aimed to explain firms’ behavior outside their home market (for a review, see Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008). This is unfortunate because the observed variation in domestic footprints around their 
sizeable mean provides an excellent opportunity to explore their role in firms’ international strategies. 
One of the few extant studies of this role found that the domestic footprint of exporters from 
Wisconsin and Illinois was negatively associated with the amount of resources they committed to 
their existing foreign markets (Cavusgil, 1984). Whether a firm’s domestic footprint also influences 
its decisions regarding expansion into new foreign markets is still unclear, however.  
We aim to start filling this lacuna by exploring the effect of a firm’s domestic footprint on the 
so-called ‘added cultural distance’ (ACD), defined as the total cultural distance that an 
internationalizing firm adds to its country portfolio in a given time period (Hutzschenreuter and Voll, 
2008; Hutzschenreuter, Voll and Verbeke, 2011). While international management (IM) research on 
cultural distance has traditionally focused on the cultural distance to individual countries (e.g., Kogut 
and Singh, 1988; Vaara, Sarala, Stahl and Björkman, 2012), ACD accounts for the fact that firms may 
enter multiple countries in the same time period. This more comprehensive approach is warranted 
because firms may implement expansion projects for different countries around the same time and 
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because an individual project, such as the acquisition of a multinational competitor, may involve 
multiple countries. Furthermore, whereas the cultural distance to a country entered has traditionally 
been calculated relative to a firm’s home country, in ACD studies that distance is calculated relative 
to the culturally closest country in the firm’s extant country portfolio, which is seldom the firm’s 
home country. The reasoning behind this approach is that the culturally closest operating location is 
generally the main source of cultural knowledge for a new foreign entry (Barkema, Bell and Pennings, 
1996) and therefore the most appropriate reference point (Hutzschenreuter and Voll, 2008; 
Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011). Of the four main forms of distance (Ghemawat, 2001), cultural distance 
is the hardest to interpret and cope with (cf. Kostova and Zaheer, 1999: 70), suggesting that decisions 
on ACD may have particularly large consequences and therefore need to be made carefully. Indeed, 
ACD has been shown to strongly hinder further international expansion (Hutzschenreuter et al., 
2011).  
Integrating resource dependence theory (RDT) (e.g., Campling and Michelson, 1998; Drees 
and Heugens, 2013; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and the attention-based view (ABV) (e.g., Bouquet, 
Morrison and Birkinshaw, 2009; Ocasio, 1997; Yu, Engleman and Van de Ven, 2005), we argue that 
firms with a larger domestic footprint are generally more dependent on domestic resources, causing 
the senior management of such firms to focus more of their attention on strategizing for the domestic 
market. As a result, these executives can devote less attention to strategy formation for international 
expansions and will therefore likely resort to formulating expansion strategies characterized by lower 
ACD. We therefore hypothesize a negative relationship between a firm’s domestic footprint and 
ACD. 
Furthermore, we propose that this relationship is contingent upon two types of domestic 
uncertainties concerning local resource contributions. Specifically, we distinguish between domestic 
uncertainty about governmental policies and domestic uncertainty about industry demand. We argue 
that whereas headquarters executives often can steer the outcome of the former type of uncertainty 
somewhat, they usually cannot steer the outcome of the latter type. We therefore propose that 
domestic policy uncertainty causes firms with a larger domestic footprint to allocate even more 
headquarters attention domestically to resolve such uncertainty favorably, whereas domestic demand 
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uncertainty causes them to allocate relatively more headquarters attention to foreign expansions to 
increase the chance that these expansions become successful hedges against that uncertainty. We 
therefore hypothesize that domestic policy uncertainty strengthens the negative relationship between a 
firm’s domestic footprint and ACD, whereas domestic demand uncertainty weakens it.  
 Measuring the domestic sales footprint of a sample of the world’s largest retailers and 
empirically relating that footprint to the cultural distance annually added by these firms over the 
period from 2000 to 2007, we find support for our hypotheses across a range of ACD measures and 
additional analyses. Overall, our findings suggest that ACDs reflect headquarters executives’ desire to 
avoid ineffective foreign expansions and, hence, that ACDs are self-selected. This insight has 
important implications, since it raises the possibility that studies of the performance effects of distance 
obtained biased results, given that these studies implicitly assumed that cross-national distance 
decisions are made without consideration of their performance consequences (cf. Shaver, 1998). 
Our study makes several noteworthy contributions. First, inspired by Hillman, Withers and 
Collin’s observation that “there is much promise in integrating other theoretical lenses with RDT” 
(2009: 1416), we merge RDT with the ABV, resulting in a novel framework that explains how a 
firm’s domestic footprint shapes its cross-cultural expansion strategy. RDT and the ABV fit well with 
each other since resource dependencies need to be managed and thus logically require managerial 
attention, and since extant applications of both theories share a focus on the behavior of senior 
executives (Drees and Heugens, 2013; Bouquet et al., 2009). Second, whereas prior studies have 
shown that a firm’s domestic footprint is often substantial (e.g., Asmussen, 2009; Oh and Rugman, 
2014), we are the first to explore its role in a firm’s internationalization strategy. Third, by showing 
that different types of domestic uncertainties moderate the effect of a firm’s domestic footprint on 
ACD in different ways, we add to the growing body of IM research on the role of home-country 
uncertainties (e.g., Tallman, 1988; Lee and Makhija, 2009; Holburn and Zelner, 2010). Finally, we 
make a methodological contribution to research on ACD by utilizing several complementary 
measures of the concept and showing that they yield results that are highly similar to those obtained 
for Hutzschenreuter et al.’s (2011) Hofstede-based measure. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
How a Firm’s Domestic Footprint Influences ACD 
According to RDT, all firms depend to some degree on resources owned or controlled by external 
actors (Drees and Heugens, 2013; Hillman et al., 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Such resources 
encompass any tangible, financial, technological, and human means and any endorsements that firms 
may receive from external market and non-market actors, including governmental protection and 
approval, inputs from suppliers and alliance partners, and payments by buyers (Kotter, 1979; Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). A firm’s dependence on external resources in a given environment is determined 
by the firm’s vulnerability to a reduction in the provision of such resources. The more a firm’s 
performance would suffer from such a reduction, the greater its dependence on the resources 
concerned (Drees and Heugens, 2013; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). All else equal, the larger a firm’s 
domestic footprint, the more of its business it conducts domestically and, hence, the more it will likely 
suffer from a reduction in the resources it receives from domestic actors. That is, the larger a firm’s 
domestic footprint, the more dependent on domestic resources it will likely be. 
According to the ABV, firms’ behavior is contingent on managerial attention, which has been 
defined as “the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing of time and effort by organizational 
decision-makers on both (a) issues; the available repertoire of categories for making sense of the 
environment: problems, opportunities, and threats; and (b) answers: the available repertoire of action 
alternatives: proposals, routines, projects, programs, and procedures” (Ocasio, 1997: 189, emphasis in 
original). Firms have only a limited amount of managerial attention at their disposal at a given point 
in time for two reasons. First, individual managers have limited cognitive abilities and therefore a 
limited attention span (Ocasio, 1997). Second, new managers are hard to attract in the short run and 
need to be trained before their attention capacity can be fully utilized (Penrose, 1959; Hutzschenreuter 
et al., 2011). Consequently, managerial attention spent on some business areas generally goes at the 
expense of the managerial attention available for other areas (Barnett, 2008; Ocasio, 1997, 2011). 
The distribution of managerial attention over different business areas is particularly relevant 
at the corporate level, since the attentional focus of managers operating at that level will likely have 
implications for a firm’s strategic direction and, hence, its long-term performance (Ocasio, 1997; 
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Joseph and Ocasio, 2012; Eggers and Kaplan, 2009). Several studies have therefore used the ABV to 
explore the antecedents and performance implications of the way in which headquarters executives 
distribute their attention across businesses, particularly in an international context (Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw, 2008; Bouquet et al., 2009; Bouquet, Barsoux and Levy, 2015). A key finding has been 
that headquarters executives tend to allocate more of their attention to businesses located in countries 
on which their firm is more dependent for resources (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008; Bouquet et al., 
2015).  
Since firms with a larger domestic footprint are generally more dependent on resources from 
their home country (as per RDT), and since firms that are more dependent on resources from a given 
country tend to allocate more headquarters attention to that country (as per the ABV), firms with a 
larger domestic footprint will likely allocate more headquarters attention domestically. Specifically, in 
such firms headquarters executives will likely spend a greater share of their time and cognitive 
capacity on strategizing for the domestic market. Among other things, they will likely be more 
involved in discussions with the national management team, domestic site visits, and interactions with 
key domestic actors such as suppliers, buyers, unions, and politicians. Consequently, firms with a 
larger domestic footprint will likely allocate less headquarters attention to the development of 
strategies for foreign expansions. As explained below, such firms will therefore likely add less 
cultural distance to their country portfolio when they expand internationally.  
 To successfully add high levels of cultural distance to their country portfolio, firms generally 
need to engage in extensive and complex forms of resource recombination, defined as the act of 
integrating a firm’s extant resources with newly-accessed foreign ones (Hutzschenreuter and Voll, 
2008; Hutzschenreuter, Voll and Verbeke, 2011; Verbeke and Asmussen, 2016). Consequently, the 
development of an effective expansion strategy involving high ACD generally demands much 
attention from headquarters executives. Specifically, they will likely need to put much time and effort 
into identifying which of their firm’s extant resources from which corporate units can be successfully 
exploited in which potential target countries, and which complementary resources need to be accessed 
locally (Meyer, Mudambi and Narula, 2011). This process will likely require headquarters executives 
to evaluate and interpret a host of quantitative and qualitative data, engage in extensive discussions 
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among themselves and with external advisors, and make repeated field visits to get personally 
acquainted with local stakeholders and their standards and habits. The chance that headquarters 
executives are able to attend to these activities thoroughly is lower for firms with a larger domestic 
footprint, since such a footprint entails a greater attentional focus on domestic strategizing. To avoid 
spending too little attention on strategy formation for planned international expansions and thereby 
lower the chance that such expansions fail, headquarters executives of firms with a larger domestic 
footprint will likely resort to expansion strategies that they can successfully mold with less time and 
effort; that is, strategies characterized by lower ACD. Consequently:    
  
Hypothesis 1: A firm’s domestic footprint is negatively related to added cultural distance. 
 
The Moderating Role of Domestic Uncertainties about Resource Contributions 
Although firms with a larger domestic footprint will likely be more dependent on domestic resources 
and therefore more vulnerable to reductions in the provision of those resources, the likelihood of such 
reductions is not the same for all countries. The reason is that countries are characterized by different 
levels of uncertainties about the continuation of local resource contributions to firms (Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008; Miller, 1993). The higher these uncertainties in a given home country, the more 
threatening the resource dependence embodied in a firm’s domestic footprint and, hence, the more 
that footprint necessitates managerial action aimed at dealing with the domestic uncertainties. 
According to RDT, senior managers have two main options for dealing with uncertainties 
about actors’ resource contributions: they can attempt to actively influence the outcome of such 
uncertainties or diversify them away (Drees and Heugens, 2013; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The 
relative attractiveness of these two options will likely depend on the nature of the uncertainty 
surrounding local actors’ resource contributions. Whereas some forms of uncertainty are partly 
endogenous in that their outcome can be steered somewhat by individual firms, others are exogenous, 
meaning that the way in which they materialize is beyond individual firms’ sphere of influence 
(Mascarenhas, 1982; Folta, 1998). Hence, firms will likely attempt to influence the outcome of 
endogenous uncertainties about resource contributions, whereas they will diversify away exogenous 
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uncertainties about such contributions (Campling and Michelson, 1998; Casciaro and Piskorski, 
2005). 
Perhaps the two most important macro-level uncertainties about resource contributions to 
firms are policy uncertainty and demand uncertainty (Brouthers and Dikova, 2010; Hill, Hwang and 
Kim, 1990; Miller, 1993). Policy uncertainty reflects the ease with which a given branch of a 
country’s government can undo existing policies or implement new ones (Delios and Henisz, 2003; 
Holburn and Zelner, 2010) and, hence, the chance that individual or groups of firms at some point 
lose governmental resources such as permits, subsidies, legal freedom, or protection from foreign 
competition. Such uncertainty is a function of the degree to which power over policy change is 
concentrated in a single government branch rather than dispersed across branches (Henisz, 2000; 
Holburn and Zelner, 2010). Demand uncertainty, on the other hand, reflects the volatility of demand 
in a given national industry (Miller, 1993; Dunning and Lundan, 2008) and, thus, the chance that 
firms in the industry experience temporal reductions in demand at a given point in time and, 
accordingly, a lower inflow of monetary resources. As explained below, since domestic policy 
uncertainty is often partly endogenous whereas domestic demand uncertainty is generally exogenous, 
these two uncertainties about domestic resource contributions will likely have opposing effects on the 
degree to which a firm’s domestic footprint channels headquarters attention to the domestic market 
and, thereby, on the degree to which that footprint constrains ACD. 
Policy uncertainty is often partly endogenous (Henisz and Delios, 2004; Henisz and Zelner, 
2003), since policymakers’ preferences about governmental resource contributions to firms often can 
be somewhat influenced by headquarters executives through political activities such as lobbying, ad 
hoc coalition building, participation in industry bodies, and informal networking with politicians 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004). By undertaking such activities, firms aim 
to resolve uncertainties about governmental resource contributions in their favor. As Hillman and 
colleagues state in their review of RDT, “firms actively seek to ‘create’ their environment by trying to 
shape government regulations that produce a more favorable environment” (2009: 1411). This is 
particularly true for large firms, such as the ones in our sample, as their political activities have been 
found to be more extensive than those of small firms (for reviews, see Hillman et al., 2004; Lux, 
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Crook and Woehr, 2011). Large U.S. retailers, for example, aim to shape U.S. legislation to their 
advantage by participating in the Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA). Soon after President 
Trump took office, several CEOs of RILA member firms met him at the Oval Office to inform him 
“about the important role the retail industry plays in our national economy” and stress “the importance 
of taking a thoughtful approach to tax reform” (RILA, 2017a), which might involve the introduction 
of a tax on foreign-sourced goods. As stated by the association’s president, “RILA will work with 
industry partners and policymakers alike to ensure that any legislation omits this harmful border 
adjustable tax” (RILA, 2017b). 
Corporate political activities usually require substantial attention from senior management, 
since they typically require repeated face-to-face meetings with lobbyists, politicians, and potential 
corporate coalition partners, and subtle managerial discourse (Schuler, 1996). The higher the policy 
uncertainty in a home country, we argue, the more a firm’s domestic footprint will cause headquarters 
executives to attend to that country in an attempt to steer the outcome of the uncertainty about 
governmental resource contributions. The reason is twofold. First, the higher the domestic policy 
uncertainty, the more the power over policy change is concentrated in a single government branch 
and, hence, the greater the clarity about which officials best to target with corporate political 
activities. Consequently, the higher the domestic policy uncertainty, the higher the chance that firms 
will succeed in their use of domestic political activities to obtain additional governmental resources 
(Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2004; Schaffer, 1995). Securing such additional resources is generally 
more beneficial to firms with a larger domestic footprint, since the performance of such firms 
generally hinges more on domestic resources. Second, the greater the concentration of political power 
within a single government branch, the lower the countervailing power of other government branches 
and, hence, the higher the chance that firms will encounter unfavorable policy changes if they abstain 
from domestic political activities (Henisz, 2000; Delios and Henisz, 2003). The loss of domestic 
resources associated with such policy changes is generally more detrimental to firms with a larger 
domestic footprint, since the performance of such firms usually hinges more on continued access to 
domestic resources. 
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Since domestic policy uncertainty will likely cause firms with a larger domestic footprint to 
allocate even more headquarters attention domestically, such uncertainty will likely leave them with 
even less headquarters attention for the development of strategies for international expansions. 
Domestic policy uncertainty will therefore likely cause the senior management of such firms to resort 
to expansion strategies that can be successfully molded with even less time and effort; that is, 
strategies characterized by even lower ACD. Put differently:    
 
Hypothesis 2a: Domestic policy uncertainty strengthens the negative relationship between a 
firm’s domestic footprint and added cultural distance. 
 
By contrast, domestic uncertainty about industry demand is generally exogenous, since the 
way in which that demand materializes is largely determined by macroeconomic factors such as 
economic growth, inflation, and interest rates, and therefore generally beyond individual firms’ sphere 
of influence (Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 1987). Although firms can respond to temporal reductions in 
domestic demand ex post through ‘push’ measures such as sales promotion and extra advertising, and 
thereby mitigate domestic revenue losses (Blattberg, Briesch and Fox, 1995; Jedidi, Mela and Gupta, 
1999), they are generally unable to influence upfront the way in which domestic demand uncertainty 
materializes.1 Corporate-level executives are therefore unlikely to spend their limited attention on 
attempting to steer the outcome of such uncertainty.  
Even though firms are generally unable to influence the way in which domestic demand 
uncertainty materializes, they do have an option at their disposal for effectively dealing with such 
uncertainty upfront. Specifically, they can diversify it away through foreign expansions, since foreign 
sales tend to provide a hedge against potential drops in domestic demand (Lee and Makhija, 2009; 
Kim, Hwang and Burgers, 1993). The higher the domestic demand uncertainty, the higher the chance 
that such drops in domestic customers’ resource contributions occur and, hence, the stronger a firm’s 
desire to turn new international expansions into successful hedges. The stronger that desire, the more 
strongly headquarters executives will be inclined to allocate their attention to planned international 
expansions rather than to the domestic market. This managerial inclination to attend relatively more to 
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planned international expansions as a function of domestic demand uncertainty will likely be stronger, 
the larger a firm’s domestic footprint. The reason is that firms with a larger domestic footprint are 
more dependent on domestic customers’ monetary resources and will therefore likely suffer more 
from decreases in the inflow of such resources if domestic demand uncertainty materializes 
unfavorably. For such firms it is therefore even more important to turn new international expansions 
into successful hedges in order to diversify away domestic demand uncertainty. Domestic demand 
uncertainty will thus weaken the inclination of firms with a larger domestic footprint to allocate more 
headquarters attention domestically and, hence, their inclination to resort to expansion strategies that 
can be successfully molded with less headquarters attention. Therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 2b: Domestic demand uncertainty weakens the negative relationship between a 
firm’s domestic footprint and added cultural distance. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data collection and sample 
To test our hypotheses, we compiled a dataset containing all foreign market entries made by the 
world’s largest retailers over the period 2000-2007. The data on these entries were derived from 
Deloitte’s annual Global Powers of Retailing reports published over 2002-2009. Each report contains 
a ranking of the world’s largest retailers based on their worldwide sales in a given year, and lists the 
national sales markets of those retailers in that year. The 2002, 2003, and 2004 reports list the national 
sales markets of the world’s largest 200 retailers, whereas the subsequent editions list these markets 
for the world’s largest 250 retailers. Where possible, we verified the listed sales markets in firms’ 
annual reports. In the few cases where we encountered inconsistencies, we used the annual report data 
rather than Deloitte’s data. 
We selected the world’s largest retailers as our research objects for several reasons. First, 
customer preferences in the retail industry differ substantially across national cultures (Ghemawat, 
2001; De Mooij and Hofstede, 2002). In this industry, the formation of expansion strategies 
characterized by high ACD will therefore likely require much more headquarters attention than the 
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formation of expansion strategies characterized by low ACD. Consequently, retailers’ ACD decisions 
will likely be sensitive to the amount of attention that their senior executives can devote to strategy 
formation for international expansions. That is, retailers’ ACD decisions are likely to vary as a 
function of the domestic footprint of these firms. Second, by focusing on retailers, we keep constant 
the motive for international expansion, since retailers mostly enter foreign countries for market-
seeking reasons (Dawson, 2007; Williams, 1992). Third, hypothesis 2a is based on the assumption 
that domestic policy uncertainty stimulates firms to undertake domestic political activities, especially 
when their domestic footprint is large. This assumption is plausible for the retailing industry, and 
especially for large firms in that industry, since retailers have been found to undertake substantial 
political activities in their home countries (Harrison, 2000; Hill, Kelly, Lockhart and Van Ness, 2013). 
Hill et al. (2013), for instance, found that the amount of lobbying in the U.S. retail industry is 
comparable to that in the U.S. tobacco and defense industries, both of which are politically sensitive 
industries. Fourth, by focusing on retailers from around the world, we were able to construct a dataset 
that not only includes multiple host countries but also multiple home countries, allowing us to 
examine whether and how domestic uncertainties moderate the effect of a firm’s domestic footprint 
on its ACD decisions.  
The population of our study consists of all retailers that appear on at least one of Deloitte’s 
annual lists published between 2002 and 2009. While the vast majority of firms feature on each of 
these lists, some firms appear on fewer of them, owing to bankruptcies, acquisitions, and the 
expansion of the list from 200 to 250 firms in 2005. Our analyses are therefore performed on an 
unbalanced panel of 218 firms and their internationalization decisions over a period of up to seven 
years, corresponding to a sample of 1095 firm-year observations. 249 observations represent cases 
where a firm expanded internationally and thus added cultural distance to its country portfolio in a 
given year, with 43.8% of them representing expansions into multiple countries. The expanding firms 
originated from 17 home countries. The other 895 observations represent cases where a firm did not 
expand internationally in a given year. As explained below, we included these cases in our analyses in 
order to avoid sample selection bias.  
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The Deloitte reports also served as the source of data on the net profits annually realized by 
each sample firm, the retailing formats they used, and the level of domestic competition they faced 
from other retailers. Additional firm-level data were obtained from Thomson One Financial, 
Compustat, and firms’ annual reports. Annual data on the characteristics of the firms’ home countries 
were obtained from Henisz’s POLCON database, Euromonitor’s Passport GMID database, and the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indicators databases.  
 
Dependent variable 
To determine ACD, defined here as the total cultural distance that a firm adds to its country portfolio 
in a given year, we followed the procedure developed by Hutzschenreuter and colleagues 
(Hutzschenreuter and Voll, 2008; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011). For every firm we determined the 
cultural distances to the countries that it entered during our sample window, and summed the cultural 
distances to any countries that it entered in the same year. When a firm entered only one country in a 
given year, the cultural distance to that country constitutes the ACD. To identify the cultural distance 
to a country entered, we calculated the cultural distances between that country and each of the 
countries in the firm’s extant portfolio and selected the smallest of these distances. We did so because, 
as stated earlier, the culturally closest operating location is generally the main source of cultural 
knowledge for a new foreign entry and therefore the most appropriate reference point.2 To calculate 
countries’ cultural distances from each of the countries in a firm’s extant portfolio, we used an 
extended version of Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index that not only encompasses Hofstede’s (1980) 
four original dimensions but also the two more recently identified dimensions of pragmatism and 
indulgence (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010).3  
To assess whether the regression results for our Hofstede-based ACD measure also hold for 
other cultural aspects, we used a similar measurement approach to calculate the linguistic and 
religious distances added by a firm annually, using Dow and Karunaratna’s (2006) data. The 
correlation of these measures of added linguistic distance (ALD) and added religious distance (ARD) 
with our ACD measure were 0.74 and 0.70, respectively, while their mutual correlation was 0.81.  
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Main independent variables  
Like earlier studies, we measure a firm’s domestic footprint in a given year by the ratio of the firm’s 
domestic annual sales to total annual sales (Carpenter and Fredrickson, 2001; Oh and Rugman, 2014; 
Rugman and Verbeke, 2007). We determined a firm’s domestic sales by subtracting its foreign sales 
from its total sales. The data on firms’ total and foreign annual sales were obtained from their annual 
reports, Thomson One, and Compustat.  
Domestic policy uncertainty is operationalized through Henisz’s (2000) POLCONIII index. 
This index measures on a zero-to-one scale the level of political constraints on policy changes in a 
given country in a given year based on data on: (i) the number of independent government branches 
(i.e., executive and lower and upper legislative) with veto power over policy changes, (ii) the 
homogeneity of the political party composition across the executive and legislative branches, and (iii) 
the heterogeneity of this composition within each legislative branch. We obtained the annual 
POLCONIII scores of the home countries of the sample firms from the 2013 release of Henisz’s 
POLCON database. Consistent with earlier research (Henisz, 2000; Holburn and Zelner, 2010), we 
multiplied these scores by -1, so that higher (i.e., less negative) scores indicate lower political 
constraints and, hence, higher policy uncertainty.  
To measure domestic demand uncertainty, we derived conditional variances from time series 
data on countries’ annual consumption over the period 1990-2007, using generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models (Bollerslev, 1986; Folta and O’Brien, 2004). These 
time series data were obtained from Euromonitor’s Passport GMID database. We fitted a separate 
GARCH model to the time series for each home country, using an M[1,1] specification (Folta and 
O’Brien, 2004; Lee and Makhija, 2009). That is, we estimated GARCH-in-mean models in which we 
set to 1 both the number of lags for the squared error terms and the number of past variances to be 
included in the computation of the current variance. The conditional variances resulting from GARCH 
models capture the uncertainty that is not predictable about any trend that may exist for each period in 
the time series (Folta and O’Brien, 2004; Lee and Makhija, 2009).  
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To test hypotheses 2a and 2b, we interacted a firm’s domestic footprint with domestic policy 
uncertainty and domestic demand uncertainty, respectively. All three variables were first mean 
centered in order to reduce multicollinearity concerns (Aiken and West, 1991). 
 
Control variables 
To rule out alternative explanations for our findings, we control for several firm and home and host-
country characteristics. We control for a firm’s multinational diversity by entering the number of 
foreign countries in its portfolio in a given year (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Tallman and Li, 
1996). We do so to exclude the possibility that a firm’s domestic footprint is negatively related to 
ACD because firms with a larger domestic footprint are internationally less diversified and therefore 
have a narrower cross-cultural experience base from which they can draw (Barkema and Vermeulen, 
1998). Similarly, we control for a firm’s product diversity by entering the number of retail formats in 
its portfolio (Gonzalez-Benito, Munoz-Gallego and Kopalle, 2005). The annual data on the number of 
foreign countries and retail formats in a firm’s portfolio were obtained from the Deloitte reports, 
which list the national markets served by the sample firms in different years and the retail formats 
they used from a total of 13. We control for a firm’s annual foreign sales because extant foreign 
operations may also require headquarters attention and therefore also cause headquarters’ executives 
to resort to expansion strategies characterized by lower ACD. Likewise, country exits may require 
headquarters attention as well. We therefore control for the number of countries that a firm exited in a 
given year (Chan, Makino and Isobe, 2006), using the Deloitte reports as our data source. We also 
include a dummy variable coded 1 for firms listed in a given annual edition of either the Franchise 
Times’ Top 200 or Franchise Direct’s Top 100 of the largest global franchises, and 0 otherwise (El 
Akremi, Perrigot and Piot-Lepetit, 2015; Lawrence and Kaufmann, 2011). We enter this variable to 
account for the possibility that firms that make extensive use of franchisees face lower cultural 
barriers in foreign countries and are therefore inclined to add higher cultural distances to their country 
portfolios than firms predominantly relying on equity modes (Erramilli, Agarwal and Dev, 2002). 
Since global brand reputation is perhaps the most important downstream asset in the retail industry 
(Ailawadi and Keller, 2004) and since it may facilitate expansions involving high ACD, we also enter 
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a dummy variable coded 1 for firms listed in a given annual edition of either Interbrand’s Best 100 
Global Brands or BrandFinance’s Best 25 Global Retail Brands, and 0 otherwise (Johansson, Dimofte 
and Mazvancheryl, 2012). Moreover, since cross-cultural expansion has been found to be more 
challenging for grocery retailers than for other types of retailers (Burt, Dawson and Sparks, 2004), we 
enter a dummy variable coded 1 for grocery retailers and 0 otherwise. We also enter a dummy 
variable coded 1 for U.S.-based retailers because 40.6% of the international expansions in our sample 
were undertaken by such retailers.  
 Besides controlling for the characteristics of firms, we also control for a range of 
characteristics of their home countries. We control for the size and growth rate of a firm’s domestic 
market by entering the natural logarithm of total annual domestic consumption and the year-on-year 
growth of that consumption. The data on both variables were obtained from Euromonitor’s Passport 
GMID database. We control for the quality of the formal institutions in each home country by entering 
home countries’ annual scores on the World Bank’s rule of law indicator (e.g., Liu, Feils and 
Scholnick, 2011), and for the intensity of peer competition in each home country by entering the 
number of retailers from Deloitte’s lists that were active in a given home country in a given year.    
Finally, we control for three characteristics of the countries entered, notably the size and 
growth rate of their market, and their institutional quality. For firms entering multiple countries in a 
given year, market size is the average of the market sizes of the countries entered, and market growth 
and institutional quality are market size-weighted averages. The data on these host-country 
characteristics were obtained from the same sources as their home-country counterparts.  
 
Estimation method 
To avoid selection bias stemming from the fact that firms only add cultural distance to their country 
portfolio when they expand internationally, we test our hypotheses using Heckman’s (1979) two-stage 
procedure, with the first stage predicting the likelihood of international expansion and the second 
stage the ACD characterizing such expansion. Following Wooldridge’s (1995) approach appropriate 
for panel data, we estimate, in the first stage, a probit model with a dependent variable coded 1 if a 
firm entered at least one foreign country in a given year and 0 if it did not. This model contains all of 
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the independent variables described above, except for those measuring the characteristics of the 
countries entered, since these variables have missing values if a firm did not expand internationally in 
a given year. The first-stage model also contains two additional independent variables, i.e. a firm’s 
age and its profitability, since these variables may also influence the likelihood of international 
expansion (Guillen, 2002; Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller and Connelly, 2006). A firm’s age was measured by 
the number of years elapsed since the firm’s founding, whereas its profitability was measured by its 
annual return on sales. The first-stage model yielded a so-called inverse Mills ratio, which was 
included as a correction term for selection bias in our second-stage ordinary least squares regressions 
of the ACD associated with international expansion. We executed Heckman’s procedure in STATA 
13 and clustered the standard errors in both stages by firm. Since it takes time to execute foreign 
expansions and add cultural distance, we lagged all time-varying independent variables by one year.  
 
RESULTS 
The regression results for the first-stage probit model are displayed in the Appendix. They show that 
competition at home from other large retailers increases the likelihood of international expansion and 
thus acts as a ‘push’ factor in retailers’ internationalization decisions, whereas the size and growth 
rate of the domestic market decrease the likelihood of international expansion and thus act as home-
country ‘pull’ factors. In addition, retailers with more foreign countries in their portfolio and those 
with a reputable brand are more likely to expand internationally, whereas those selling groceries are 
less likely to do so. Interestingly, neither a firm’s domestic footprint nor the interactions between that 
footprint and domestic policy and demand uncertainty exert significant influences on the likelihood of 
international expansion. 
Table I reports the bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics for the variables included in 
the second-stage models. Except for the correlation between the indicators of a firm’s product 
diversity and whether a firm is a grocery retailer (r=0.70), all other correlations between the 
independent variables are lower than 0.6, suggesting the absence of multicollinearity in our regression 
models. This was confirmed by the fact that the variation inflation factors (VIFs) of all variables in all 
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models reported in Tables II and III were well below the commonly-accepted multicollinearity 
threshold of 10, with the highest VIF being 4.66 (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson and Tatham, 2006).  
------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES I AND II ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 Table II shows the results of the first set of OLS regression analyses that we ran to test our 
hypotheses. Model 2 tests hypothesis 1, which predicted that a firm’s domestic footprint would be 
negatively related to ACD. This hypothesis is supported, since the regression coefficient of a firm’s 
domestic footprint is significantly negative in Model 2 (p<0.01). Models 3 and 5 test hypothesis 2a, 
which proposed that domestic policy uncertainty strengthens the negative relationship between a 
firm’s domestic footprint and ACD. This hypothesis is also supported, since the coefficient of the 
interaction between a firm’s domestic footprint and domestic policy uncertainty is significantly 
negative in both models (p<0.05). Figure 1 displays how a firm’s domestic footprint is related to ACD 
at relatively low and relatively high levels of domestic policy uncertainty, i.e. at uncertainty levels one 
standard deviation below and above the sample mean, respectively. Consistent with our hypothesis, 
the figure shows that a firm’s domestic footprint is negatively related to ACD for both low and high 
levels of domestic policy uncertainty, but even more so for high levels. 
Hypothesis 2b stated that domestic demand uncertainty weakens the negative relationship 
between a firm’s domestic footprint and ACD. This hypothesis also receives support, as the 
interaction between a firm’s domestic footprint and domestic demand uncertainty is significantly 
positive in both Model 4 and Model 5 (p<0.05). Figure 2 shows that the relationship between a firm’s 
domestic footprint and ACD is indeed substantially less negative for levels of domestic demand 
uncertainty one standard deviation above its sample mean than for those one standard deviation below 
that mean.4  
Table III shows the results of the second-stage OLS regressions that we ran to test the validity 
of our hypotheses for ALD and ARD. For both alternative dependent variables, we continue to find 
support for our hypotheses (p<0.05).5 
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Additional analyses  
To assess the robustness of the above results, we performed several additional analyses.6 First, we 
excluded U.S. firms from our first and second-stage samples, since such firms make up more than 
40% of the observations in both samples. Second, we replaced our POLCONIII-based measure of 
domestic policy uncertainty by the standard deviation of a home country’s relative political extraction 
(RPE) score over the previous five years. This RPE score reflects a domestic government’s 
effectiveness in collecting taxes and using the proceeds to accomplish goals. Fluctuations in that 
effectiveness over time, as measured by the standard deviation of a country’s annual RPE score, imply 
policy uncertainty for firms (Feng, 2001; Organski and Kugler, 1980). Third, we created market size-
weighted measures of a firm’s domestic footprint and the three forms of added distance. Specifically, 
we multiplied a firm’s domestic footprint by the natural logarithm of domestic consumption and 
multiplied the cultural, linguistic, and religious distances to a country entered by the natural logarithm 
of the country’s consumption level. The data source for countries’ annual consumption levels was 
Euromonitor’s Passport GMID database. Finally, we used the same source to gather data on the 
annual domestic market share of our sample firms and used that share as an alternative weight in the 
measure of a firm’s domestic footprint. Since the data on these shares were only available as of 2003, 
our first-stage sample was reduced to 618 observations and our second-stage sample to 157 
observations. As summarized in Table IV, the regression results for all of these subsample analyses 
and alternative measurement approaches also yield substantial support for our hypotheses.7   
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Contributions and Implications 
It is well known that the value-adding activities of most large firms are regionally concentrated rather 
than globally spread (Rugman and Verbeke, 2004, 2007; Verbeke and Asmussen, 2016). Less well 
known is that the concentration of firms’ activities in their home region is explained to a large extent 
by their sizeable domestic footprint (Asmussen, 2009; Oh and Rugman, 2014; Osegowitsch and 
Sammartino, 2008). Perhaps because of scholars’ unawareness of this fact, the role of a firm’s 
domestic footprint in its internationalization strategy has not been studied previously. To uncover that 
role, we examined the relationship between a firm’s domestic footprint and its annual decisions on 
ACD, and how this relationship is moderated by domestic environmental uncertainties. Our finding 
that firms tend to add less cultural distance to their sales market portfolio when they have a larger 
domestic sales footprint indicates that the geographic focus of a firm’s downstream activities plays a 
key role in its cross-cultural expansion strategy. Furthermore, by showing that the impact of a firm’s 
domestic footprint on ACD critically depends on domestic environmental uncertainties, we contribute 
to the growing body of IM research on the role of home-country uncertainties (Tallman, 1988; Lee 
and Makhija, 2009; Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Sahaym, Trevino and Steensma, 2012; Tan and 
Chintakananda, 2016). Specifically, the opposing moderating effects of domestic policy uncertainty 
and domestic demand uncertainty make clear that, when considered in combination with a firm’s 
domestic footprint, not all domestic uncertainties shape its internationalization in the same way. 
Domestic policy uncertainty, on the one hand, seems to encourage firms with a larger domestic 
footprint to ‘fight’ more for their domestic market because such partly endogenous uncertainty seems 
to induce them to allocate even more headquarters attention domestically, causing them to add even 
less cultural distance to their country portfolio. Domestic demand uncertainty, on the other hand, 
seems to trigger a ‘flight’ response from them because such generally exogenous uncertainty seems to 
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stimulate the allocation of headquarters attention to international expansions, causing a firm’s 
domestic footprint to constrain the addition of cultural distance to a lesser extent.  
Our finding that a firm’s domestic footprint has a negative relationship with ACD and that 
this relationship is moderated by domestic environmental uncertainties provides support for our 
theoretical framework, which uniquely combines insights from RDT and the ABV. Specifically, a 
firm’s dependence on domestic resources and environmental uncertainties about the provision of these 
resources seem to jointly determine the distribution of headquarters attention between strategizing for 
the domestic market and strategizing about foreign expansions and, thereby, the ACD characterizing 
foreign expansion strategies. These insights suggest that domestic resource dependencies, and the 
managerial attention they require, have noteworthy consequences for internationalization strategies 
and should therefore be given greater consideration in IM research (cf. Xia, Ma, Lu and Yiu, 2014). 
Our finding that a firm’s domestic footprint negatively affects ACD but not the likelihood of 
international expansion suggests that domestic resource dependence does not keep firms from 
expanding internationally per se, but rather leads them to opt for expansion strategies that are 
culturally more conservative. More specifically, our results suggest that headquarters executives tailor 
the content of their foreign expansion plans to the attention they can allocate to shaping these plans. 
Indirectly, our study thus also sheds some light on the process of international strategy formulation, 
which so far largely remains a black box (Maitland and Sammartino, 2015).   
Overall, our findings suggest that ACDs reflect senior managers’ desire to avoid ineffective 
foreign expansions and, hence, that ACDs are self-selected. This insight has important implications 
for the stream of IM research on the performance effects of ACD and other forms of cross-national 
distance. Studies within that stream have explored how the performance of multinational firms as a 
whole is affected by ACD (Hutzschenreuter and Voll, 2008) and how the performance of individual 
foreign investments such as acquisitions and joint ventures is affected by the destination country’s 
cultural distance (for reviews, see Stahl and Voight, 2008; Tihanyi, Griffith and Russell, 2005) as well 
as its regulatory and economic distance (e.g., Gaur and Lu, 2007; Tsang and Yip, 2007). A substantial 
portion of these studies found that distance has negative performance effects. However, they did not 
control or correct empirically for the possibility that firms purposively select the cross-national 
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distance associated with foreign expansion so as to avoid poor performance, a possibility for which 
we find supporting evidence. Consequently, they may have obtained biased estimates of the 
performance effects of distance, in that they might have obtained no distance effect at all had they 
empirically incorporated our insight that firms self-select the distance associated with foreign 
expansion (cf. Shaver, 1998). To rule out the possible presence of biases caused by distance self-
selection, future studies of the performance consequences of distance are recommended to implement 
Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure. This procedure involves first regressing the distances 
observed in a sample on their likely strategic determinants to generate a correction term for distance 
self-selection, and then entering this correction term in the regression model used for estimating the 
performance effect of distance. The use of this procedure may shed new light on the performance 
effects of various types of cross-national distances. 
Finally, our study contributes to the measurement of added distances in the sphere of culture 
by complementing Hutzschenreuter and colleagues’ Hofstede-based ACD measure with novel 
measures of ALD and ARD. Our finding that our hypotheses also hold for the latter two measures 
adds to the internal validity of our study, and shows the promise of moving from a singular to a 
multifaceted measurement approach towards added distance.  
 
Limitations and Research Suggestions 
Several caveats apply to our work. First, as in several prior studies (e.g., Chan, Finnegan and 
Sternquist, 2011; Dawson, 2007), Deloitte’s Global Powers of Retailing reports were an important 
source of data for our study, even though we could not verify the reliability of these data for all of our 
observations. However, since we identified only some minor inconsistencies in the cases where we 
could verify the Deloitte data in firms’ annual reports, we believe these data to be sufficiently reliable. 
Second, owing to data restrictions, we only explored the moderating effects of uncertainties 
about resource provisions by domestic government branches and domestic customers. However, firms 
may also be dependent on other domestic actors such as alliance partners, and the provision of 
resources by those actors may also be characterized by uncertainties (Drees and Heugens, 2013; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Such uncertainties may also influence how strongly a firm’s domestic 
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footprint curbs its cross-cultural expansion leaps. Moreover, firms in general and retailers in particular 
are often also dependent on foreign suppliers and other foreign actors, and the uncertainties associated 
with the provision of resources by such actors may also influence a firm’s internationalization strategy 
(Connelly, Ketchen and Hult, 2013). Future studies may attempt to shed light on these possibilities. 
Third, we tested our hypotheses on a sample of retailers, which predominantly 
internationalize to seek new markets. Although this enabled us to keep constant the motive for 
internationalization, the downside is that we do not know whether our results are generalizable to 
Dunning’s (1998) other internationalization motives. When the aim of a foreign expansion is to gain 
access to natural resources, for instance, firms with a larger domestic footprint may allocate more 
rather than less headquarters attention to that expansion, since they may have a stronger desire to 
secure access to the resources as a way of protecting their domestic sales empire. Moreover, our 
sample firms had an average operating history of over 50 years and an average domestic footprint of 
0.75, suggesting that they have long been focused mainly on their home market. International new 
ventures (INVs), on the other hand, are internationally oriented from the outset and therefore usually 
have a substantially lower domestic footprint (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994; Knight and Cavusgil, 
2004; Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2010). The domestic footprint of such ventures may therefore show a 
different relationship with ACD. Future studies could explore these possibilities by analyzing other 
samples of firms. 
Consistent with our focus on market-seeking firms, we focused on the domestic footprint of 
firms in terms of their sales. A firm’s domestic sales footprint mainly captures the domestic 
concentration of a firm’s downstream activities and not so much that of its upstream activities, whose 
domestic concentration is better accounted for in a firm’s domestic asset footprint (Rugman and 
Verbeke, 2004). Although the average domestic asset footprint has been found to be similar to the 
average domestic sales footprint (Hejazi, 2007; Oh and Rugman, 2014), the two types of footprints 
may channel headquarters executives’ attention to the domestic market to different degrees, and may 
therefore exert differential limiting effects on ACD. Future studies could explore this possibility.  
We also encourage scholars to extend the scope of our analyses to other forms of added 
distance (cf. Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst and Lange, 2014) and to other aspects of 
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internationalization, such as the pace with which firms expand (Gao and Pan, 2010) and their choice 
of expansion mode (Slangen, 2011). Such extensions would contribute to the development of a more 
holistic view of the role of a firm’s domestic footprint in its internationalization strategy. 
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NOTES 
1 Moreover, decisions on the use of these ‘push’ measures are unlikely to require the attention of headquarters 
executives, since such marketing decisions are usually at the discretion of lower-level managers (Aylmer, 1970; 
Picard, Boddewyn and Grosse, 1998). The same applies to analyses of the growth potential of an uncertain 
domestic market. Such analyses are usually carried out by the domestic management team rather than by 
corporate-level executives (Alfoldi, Clegg and McGaughey, 2012; Schilit, 1987).  
2 For 14.9% of the observations, the ACD score equals the cultural distance from the entrant’s home country. 
These observations represent first foreign expansions by firms into single countries. 
3 We did not use data from the GLOBE study because these data were only available for about half of the 
sample of international expansions. 
4 As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, we also explored the existence of non-linear direct and moderating 
effects of domestic demand uncertainty. We did not find empirical support for such effects. 
5 For all three dependent variables, we also explored the existence of a three-way interaction between a firm’s 
domestic footprint and the two domestic uncertainties. We did not find empirical support for such an interaction. 
6 The detailed results of these analyses are available from us upon request. 
7 Besides using the size of the domestic market and a firm’s domestic market share as weights in the 
measurement of a firm’s domestic footprint, we also explored whether the first two variables moderated the 
effect of a firm’s (unweighted) domestic footprint. We found that they did not, indicating that the negative effect 
of a firm’s domestic footprint on ACD does not vary with the size of the domestic market or with a firm’s 
domestic market share. We obtained similar results when we used ALD and ARD as dependent variables. 
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APPENDIX 
 
First-stage probit regression of the likelihood of 
international expansion 
Independent variables Coefficients 
Firm’s domestic footprint  -0.26 (.16)  
Firm’s domestic footprint x Domestic 
policy uncertainty 
-0.01 (.11) 
Firm’s domestic footprint x Domestic 
demand uncertainty 
0.13 (.09) 
  
Domestic policy uncertainty 0.01 (.15) 
Domestic demand uncertainty 0.00 (.10) 
Firm’s multinational diversity 0.91 (.17)*** 
Firm’s product diversity 0.25 (.17) 
Firm’s total foreign sales 0.09 (.11) 
Country exits by firm 0.03 (.09) 
Firm is large franchisor 0.02 (.13) 
Firm has a reputable brand 0.37 (.17)* 
Firm is grocery retailer -0.84 (.24)*** 
Firm is U.S. retailer -0.64 (.37)† 
Firm’s age -0.30 (.17)† 
Firm’s profitability 0.01 (.08) 
Domestic market size -1.07 (.33)**  
Domestic market growth -0.22 (.10)* 
Domestic rule of law 0.03 (.18) 
Domestic peer competition 1.48 (.41)*** 
  
Number of observations 1,095 
Number of firms 218 
Number of home countries 26 
Log likelihood -332.9 
Wald χ² 82.6*** 
 
Intercept included but not shown; robust standard 
errors in parentheses; † p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed) 
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Table I: Descriptive statistics and correlations  
Variable                                              Mean        S.D.          1            2             3             4           5            6             7             8            9           10          11          12          13          14          15          16          17          
1. ACD 0.59 0.80                  
2. ALD 0.54 0.62 0.74                
3. ARD 0.20 0.24 0.70 0.81               
4. Firm's domestic footprint 0.75 0.27 -0.17 -0.28 -0.28              
5. Domestic policy uncertainty -0.43 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.03 -0.17             
6. Domestic demand uncertainty 0.77 0.80 0.04 0.17 0.12 -0.18 0.04            
7. Firm’s multinational diversity 12.2 12.0 0.13 0.45 0.35 -0.40 -0.09 0.21           
8. Firm’s product diversity 2.65 2.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 0.40 0.18 0.08          
9. Firm’s total foreign sales 4626 8734 0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 0.08 0.32         
10. Country exits by firm 0.26 0.98 0.00 0.09 -0.02 -0.15 -0.05 0.14 0.17 -0.02 0.05        
11. Firm is large franchisor 0.08 0.27 0.13 0.10 0.09 -0.30 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09       
12. Firm has a reputable brand 0.48 0.50 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.18 -0.23 0.02 0.22 0.08 0.30 0.06 0.13      
13. Firm is grocery retailer 0.24 0.43 -0.09 -0.12 -0.09 -0.11 0.45 0.12 -0.01 0.70 0.46 -0.02 0.21 0.14     
14. Firm is U.S. retailer 0.41 0.49 -0.18 -0.36 -0.26 0.42 -0.30 -0.57 -0.30 -0.46 0.06 -0.18 -0.15 0.11 -0.27      
15. Domestic market size 13.5 1.18 -0.16 -0.25 -0.18 0.45 -0.41 -0.47 -0.20 -0.50 0.07 -0.09 -0.10 0.15 -0.42 0.52     
16. Domestic market growth 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.05 -0.17 -0.04 0.21 0.10 0.01 -0.03 0.23 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.23 -0.29    
17. Domestic rule of law 1.50 0.26 -0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.15 -0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.05 -0.33 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.04 -0.02   
18. Domestic peer competition 70.6 36.1 -0.17 -0.31 -0.24 0.42 -0.40 -0.51 -0.25 -0.52 0.08 -0.12 -0.14 0.16 -0.36 0.52 0.57 -0.21 0.12  
19. Host-country market size 11.2 1.50 0.27 0.35 0.35 -0.12 -0.04 0.19 0.21 0.06 0.03 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.13 -0.04 0.08 0.02  
20. Host-country market growth 0.53 0.80 0.19 0.29 0.23 -0.12 -0.00 0.18 0.20 -0.08 -0.09 0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.12 -0.14 -0.09 0.21 0.12  
21. Host-country rule of law 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.05 -0.05 -0.12 -0.11 0.15 0.16 0.03 0.05  
22. Inverse Mills ratio 1.21 0.98 -0.14 -0.36 -0.31 0.46 0.31 -0.14 -0.39 0.03 -0.13 -0.22 -0.16 -0.33 0.25 0.12 0.05 -0.07 -0.10  
                                                                                                18          19          20          21 
19. Host-country market size   -0.09                  
20. Host-country market growth   -0.09 0.56                 
21. Host-country rule of law   0.16 0.48 0.20                
22. Inverse Mills ratio   0.02 -0.16 -0.18 0.05               
 
Correlations greater than |0.12|are significant at p<0.05, while those greater than |0.16| are significant at p <0.01 
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Table II: Second-stage OLS regression analyses of ACD 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Firm’s domestic footprint (H1) - -0.30 (.09)** -0.32 (.09)** -0.29 (.09)**  -0.29 (.09)** 
Firm’s domestic footprint x Domestic 
policy uncertainty (H2a) 
- - -0.12 (.06)* - -0.13 (.06)* 
Firm’s domestic footprint x Domestic 
demand uncertainty (H2b) 
- - - 0.16 (.07)* 0.16 (.07)* 
    
Domestic policy uncertainty 0.24 (.10)* 0.19 (.10)† 0.05 (.12) 0.19 (.20) 0.05 (.12) 
Domestic demand uncertainty 0.07 (.04)† 0.06 (.04) 0.06 (.04) 0.06 (.04) 0.06 (.04) 
Firm’s multinational diversity 0.07 (.10) 0.08 (.10) 0.08 (.09) 0.04 (.10) 0.04 (.10) 
Firm’s product diversity -0.04 (.11) -0.07 (.11) -0.07 (.11) -0.07 (.11) -0.07 (.11) 
Firm’s total foreign sales 0.08 (.07) 0.06 (.07) 0.06 (.07) 0.07 (.07) 0.07 (.07) 
Country exits by firm 0.02 (.03) -0.01 (.03) -0.01 (.03) 0.00 (.03) -0.00 (.03) 
Firm is large franchisor 0.23 (.07)** 0.20 (.07)** 0.22 (.08)** 0.20 (.07)** 0.22 (.07)** 
Firm has a reputable brand -0.03 (.12) -0.09 (.12) -0.09 (.12) -0.07 (.12) -0.08 (.12) 
Firm is grocery retailer -0.51 (.21)* -0.27 (.22) -0.29 (.23) -0.31 (.22) -0.34 (.22) 
Firm is U.S. retailer 0.10 (.24) 0.06 (.24) 0.08 (.25) 0.01 (.24) 0.08 (.25) 
Domestic market size -0.50 (.26)† -0.11 (.28) -0.06 (.28) -0.09 (.27) -0.02 (.28) 
Domestic market growth 0.02 (.05)  0.06 (.05) 0.06 (.05)  0.05 (.05) 0.05 (.05) 
Domestic rule of law 0.07 (.15) 0.06 (.14) 0.02 (.15) 0.05 (.14) 0.01 (.14) 
Domestic peer competition 0.01 (.26)  -0.33 (.27) -0.24 (.27) -0.26 (.27) -0.15 (.28) 
Host-country market size 0.11 (.03)** 0.11 (.03)*** 0.11 (.03)*** 0.12 (.03)*** 0.11 (.03)*** 
Host-country market growth 0.02 (.03) 0.03 (.03) 0.02 (.03) 0.03 (.03) 0.02 (.03) 
Host-country rule of law -0.02 (.02) -0.02 (.02) -0.02 (.02) -0.02 (.02) -0.02 (.02) 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.04 (.15) -0.43 (.18)* -0.38 (.18)* -0.37 (.18)* -0.30 (.18) 
      
Number of observations 249 249 249 249 249 
Number of firms 97 97 97 97 97 
Number of home countries 17 17 17 17 17 
R² 0.19 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.30 
Wald χ² 58.4*** 75.3*** 80.5*** 80.8*** 83.0*** 
 
Intercept included but not shown; robust standard errors in parentheses;  
† p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed) 
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Figure 1: Effect of a firm’s domestic footprint on ACD at low and high levels of domestic policy uncertainty 
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Figure 2: Effect of a firm’s domestic footprint on ACD at low and high levels of domestic demand uncertainty 
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Table III: Second-stage OLS regression analyses of ALD and ARD 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent variables ALD ARD ALD ARD ALD ARD ALD ARD 
Firm’s domestic footprint (H1) -0.15 (.07)* -0.09 (.03)** -0.15 (.07)* -0.09 (.03)** -0.16 (.07) * -0.09 (.03)** -0.16 (.07)* -0.09 (.03)** 
Firm’s domestic footprint x Domestic 
policy uncertainty (H2a) 
- - -0.06 (.04)* -0.02 (.01)* - - -0.06 (.04)* -0.03 (.02)* 
Firm’s domestic footprint x Domestic 
demand uncertainty (H2b) 
- - - - 0.03 (.02)* 0.02 (.01)* 0.03 (.02)* 0.02 (.01)* 
       
Domestic policy uncertainty 0.15 (.06)* 0.07 (.02)* 0.13 (.07)† 0.07 (.03)* 0.14 (.06)* 0.07 (.03)* 0.12 (.07)* 0.07 (.03)* 
Domestic demand uncertainty 0.07 (.03)* 0.02 (.01)† 0.08 (.04)* 0.02 (.01) † 0.07 (.04)* 0.02 (.02) 0.08 (.04)* 0.02 (.02) 
Firm’s multinational diversity 0.05 (.05) 0.01 (.02) 0.05 (.05) 0.01 (.03) 0.05 (.06) 0.01 (.02) 0.05 (.06) 0.01 (.03) 
Firm’s product diversity -0.14 (.07)* -0.04 (.03) -0.14 (.07)† -0.04 (.03) -0.14 (.07)† -0.04 (.03) -0.14 (.07)† -0.04 (.03) 
Firm’s total foreign sales -0.00 (.03) -0.01 (.02) -0.00 (.03) -0.01 (.02) 0.00 (.03) -0.01 (.02) 0.00 (.03) -0.01 (.02) 
Country exits by firm -0.00 (.03) -0.01 (.01) -0.00 (.03) -0.01 (.01) 0.00 (.03) -0.01 (.01) -0.00 (.03) -0.01 (.01) 
Firm is large franchisor 0.05 (.03) 0.03 (.02)* 0.05 (.03) 0.03 (.02)* 0.06 (.03)† 0.03 (.01)* 0.05 (.03) 0.03 (.02)* 
Firm has a reputable brand 0.05 (.05) 0.01 (.02) 0.04 (.05) 0.01 (.02) 0.05 (.05) 0.01 (.02) 0.04 (.05) 0.01 (.02) 
Firm is grocery retailer -0.12 (.12) -0.05 (.05) 0.12 (.12) -0.05 (.05) -0.13 (.12) -0.05 (.05) 0.03 (.10) -0.06 (.05) 
Firm is U.S. retailer -0.24 (.15) -0.06 (.07) -0.24 (.15) -0.07 (.07) -0.27 (.16)† -0.07 (.07) -0.13 (.12) -0.07 (.07) 
Domestic market size -0.07 (.15) -0.01 (.07) -0.07 (.15) -0.01 (.07) -0.07 (.15) -0.01 (.07) -0.07 (.15) 0.01 (.07) 
Domestic market growth -0.02 (.04) -0.02 (.02) -0.01 (.03) -0.02 (.02) -0.02 (.04) -0.01 (.01) -0.02 (.04) -0.02 (.02) 
Domestic rule of law 0.09 (.08) 0.06 (.04)† 0.09 (.08) 0.06 (.04)† 0.10 (.08) 0.07 (.04)† 0.09 (.08) 0.06 (.04)† 
Domestic peer competition -0.06 (.22) -0.03 (.09) -0.06 (.22) -0.03 (.09) -0.04 (.22) -0.03 (.09) -0.03 (.22) -0.02 (.09) 
Host-country market size 0.10 (.03)** 0.06 (.01)*** 0.10 (.03)** 0.06 (.01)*** 0.10 (.03)** 0.06 (.01)*** 0.10 (.03)** 0.06 (.01)*** 
Host-country market growth 0.01 (.03) -0.01 (.01) 0.01 (.03) -0.01 (.01) 0.01 (.03) -0.01 (.01) 0.01 (.03) -0.01 (.01) 
Host-country rule of law 0.00 (.02) -0.02 (.01)* -0.00 (.02) -0.02 (.01)* -0.00 (.02) -0.02 (.01)† -0.00 (.02) -0.02 (.01)† 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.08 (.12) -0.03 (.05) -0.08 (.12) -0.03 (.05) -0.06 (.12) -0.02 (.05) -0.06 (.12) -0.02 (.05) 
         
Number of observations 249 249 249 249 249 249 249 249 
Number of firms 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
Number of home countries 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
R² 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.31 
Wald χ² 95.8*** 76.9*** 99.0*** 75.9*** 95.7*** 78.8*** 98.8*** 77.9*** 
 
Intercept included but not shown; robust standard errors in parentheses;  † p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed) 
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Table IV: Summary reports of additional analyses 
 
 
 
 
 
ACD 
 
ALD 
 
ARD 
Excluding U.S. firms1 Hypothesis 1 Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Hypothesis 2a Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Marginally supported 
(p < 0.10) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Hypothesis 2b Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Marginally supported 
(p < 0.10) 
Measuring domestic policy uncertainty by 
the standard deviation of a home 
country’s RPE score  
Hypothesis 1 Supported 
(p < 0.01) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Supported 
(p < 0.01) 
Hypothesis 2a Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Hypothesis 2b Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Marginally supported 
(p < 0.10) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Using market size-weighted measures of 
ACD, ALD, ARD, and a firm’s domestic 
footprint 
Hypothesis 1 Supported 
(p < 0.01) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Supported 
(p < 0.01) 
Hypothesis 2a Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Hypothesis 2b Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Using a firm’s domestic market share as a 
weight in the measure of a firm’s domestic 
footprint2 
 
Hypothesis 1 Supported 
(p < 0.01) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Hypothesis 2a Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Marginally supported 
(p < 0.10) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Hypothesis 2b Supported 
(p < 0.001) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
 
1 598 observations remaining for stage 1 and 148 for stage 2; 2 618 observations remaining for stage 1 and 157 for stage 2. For those analyses where the level of support 
for hypotheses 2a and 2b depended on whether the interaction terms were included separately or together, the most conservative level of support is reported. 
 
 
 
